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Abstract
This paper extends the literature by developing an objective market-based index, which is
dynamic and continuous and can be used to measure the monetary policy transparency
for a country or, simultaneously, a series of countries. It was found that the agents in the
money market are forward looking and that the more transparent the monetary policy is,
the less risky and volatile the money market will be. Furthermore, during the tenure of
Chairman Greenspan, the volatility and risk in the money market fell. The policy regime
changes of adjusting the target rate by multiples of 25 or 50 basis points and including a
balance-of-risks sentence in FOMC statements also resulted in a reduction in volatility in
money markets. 
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I. Introduction
Central banks are unequivocally moving towards greater openness or to more
transparent monetary policy frameworks by engaging in, among other things, inflation
targeting, publishing inflation forecasts and increasing the number of public statements
from bank officials. Whether such moves are desirable or not, or to what degree they are
desirable, is still open to question. The theoretical studies in favor of and/or against more
transparency in central banking, although ample, are not unanimous in their findings, and
empirical tests of these arguments are scarce, mostly because transparency in the
monetary policy is a concept hard to measure.
The existing transparency measures have some limitations. Most of them are not
in time-series form and so can only be used for cross-sectional studies. Moreover, they
can only be used for a limited number of hypotheses. They are based on the quantity,
timeliness, and periodicity of information provided by central banks and finally, they are
somehow static. In general, the existing measures of transparency can be divided into
four groups:
(i) Descriptive accounts of transparency: This kind of transparency measure
concentrates on strategies that central bankers follow in order to communicate with the
public. It mostly includes do’s and don’ts of the central bankers’ actions, see, e.g.,
Blinder et al. (2001). The main problem with this measure is that no index can be
derived/constructed from these do’s and don’ts.
(ii) Central bank surveys or self-evaluating transparency indexes: A series of
surveys are sent to central banks to investigate the extent to which they communicate
their private information to the public, including the degree to which they are following
the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies
developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see, e.g., Fry et al. (2000) and
Sundararajan et al. (2003). With this type of measures there is a possibility of
2misunderstanding the survey questions and/or manipulating responses by the central
banks to obtain an appropriate score.
(iii) Official documents and information: Researchers construct indexes of
transparency of monetary policy by evaluating the behavior of central bankers (e.g.,
whether they give speeches regularly or not) and the type and frequency of documents the
central bank makes available to the public (such as minutes from meetings, inflation
reports, etc.), see, e.g., Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) and de Haan and Amtenbrink
(2002). One possible weakness with this approach is that the particular items looked at
and the weight assigned to them by each set of authors may differ for purely subjective
reasons.
Furthermore, these measures quantify the degree of openness of central banks
based on the information provided, but do not necessarily reflect the true degree of
understanding, by the public, of central banking practices. In sum, the common problem
with the above three measures is that they are not in time-series form; instead, they are
calculated for cross-sectional studies. Thus, these measures limit the number of
hypotheses that may be tested concerning the impact of more transparent monetary
policies in the economy. 
(iv) Market-based indicators: These indexes are based on what market participants
understand from the central banks’ actions and signals as well as the implementation of
the monetary policy. The existing market-based indicators also have limitations. For
example, Howells and Mariscal (2002) provide a measure of monetary policy
transparency for a small number of cross-section countries, therefore, limiting the number
of hypotheses that may be tested. 
The degree to which market participants understand and anticipate monetary
policy can also be gauged by using time-series market-based expectations of monetary
policy, and more particularly, high frequency measures of monetary policy surprises. In
general, the time-series market-based measures of policy surprises in the U.S. include
those based on federal funds futures rates, e.g., Poole and Rasche (2000), Kuttner (2001)
and Söderström (2001). These measures restrict the analysis to post 1988, the year when
this market was established. Furthermore, as it was mentioned by Poole et al. (2002), Fed
funds rate futures could reflect the expected changes in the target rate only if the times of
3target rate changes were known. Since this information became available only after 1994,
these measures further restrict researchers to post 1994. 
Other measures are based on actual market rates including Treasury bill rates and
Eurodollar deposit rates, e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002). These measures mostly
concentrate on a change in the single interest rate at the time of a target change. A single
rate does not contain full information on the monetary policy transparency as, in general,
interest rates, and especially their relationships, reflect the behavior of market
participants (arbitrageurs and speculators). Consequently, these measures are static and,
more seriously, they are very narrowly defined by putting too much emphasis on a single
piece of information. 
Finally, some policy surprise measures are based on the analysis of the financial
press, e.g., Poole et al. (2002) and Söderström (2001). These measures can be subjective
as the interpretation of the financial press fully depends on the background and
experience of the researchers. The overall limitation of these measures arises from the
fact that they are usually series of unequal intervals. Therefore, they may restrict the
researcher to studies with quarterly or less frequent data or to specific techniques of
estimation such as the factor-model approach which allows the researcher to deal
systematically with data irregularities [e.g., Stock and Watson (2002)]. 
It should be noted that the construction of a market-based index depends on the
characteristics of the market or markets whose prices are used to establish the index.
Consequently, it is extremely important to identify the market(s) carefully before
constructing a monetary policy index based on the information generated from the
market(s). The purpose of this paper is to develop an index, which is dynamic and can be
used to measure the monetary policy transparency for an individual or, simultaneously, a
series of countries. To the best knowledge of the author, no such index exists in the
literature. In this study the measure is developed for the United States monetary policy
for the 1982-2003 period. The choice of the country is based on the fact that the United
States has a complex banking system (12 Federal Reserves) with no clear policy
objectives, like inflation targeting, interest rate band, etc. Consequently, the index, if
successful in detecting the Federal Reserve monetary transparency, will be useful in
4checking the central bank transparency of any country, especially countries that have
clear monetary policy goals like Canada and New Zealand.
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, a monetary
policy index was constructed. Such an index is dynamic and can also be continuous when
intraday minute or shorter interval observations are used. Second, it was found agents in
the money market in the U.S. are forward looking in the sense of Lucas (1976). Finally, it
was found, using the index, that the more transparent the monetary policy is, the less
risky and volatile the money market will be. 
Section II provides a description of our data and the validity of the assumptions
used to develop the index. Section III is devoted to the theoretical foundation of the index
and its construction. Section IV covers the empirical tests on the power of the index in
investigating the hypothesis that higher transparency reduces risk and volatility in the
money market. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.
II. Data Description and the Validity of the Assumptions
In this section we describe the data used in this paper and their sources. We also
explain the necessary assumptions for the development of the index. Finally, we will
provide empirical evidence for the validity of these assumptions in our sample period.
A. Data description
The daily data on the Fed funds effective, the Treasury bill (secondary market)
and the exchange rates (Japanese Yen per one US dollar) for the period 1982
(October 5)-2003 (December 31) are used. The number of observations is 5308 days. The
source of these data is the St. Louis Federal Reserve website. The effective Fed funds rate
is a weighted average of the rates on Fed funds transactions of a group of Fed funds
brokers who report their transactions daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Data on GDP and the Federal Government debt outstanding were obtained from the same
source. The data on GDP and debt are quarterly observations. To generate a daily series,
an interpolation of these series was computed. Specifically, an ARIMA(1,1,0) process
was used while the last value in each period was maintained.
The choice of the sample period is based on the availability of data on target Fed
funds rates. According to Sarno and Thornton (2003, p. 1099), the Fed was explicitly
5targeting the funds rate from 1974 to October 1979. The Fed switched to a non-borrowed
reserves operation procedure in October 1979, and in October 1982 switched to a
borrowed reserves operating procedure. However, “Exactly when the Fed switched from
a borrowed reserve operating procedure to an explicit funds rate targeting procedure is
contentious [...] there seems to be general agreement that the Fed has explicitly targeted
the funds rate at least since the late 1980s.” In any event, for the purpose of this paper and
the construction of the index, available target rates with their respective dates are needed.
To the best knowledge of the author, a non-interrupted set of data on Fed funds
target rates is only available from October 1982. For the period 1982-1989 we use a
series prepared by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Secretariat. This series
is based on the staff’s interpretations of FOMC transcripts and other documents publicly
available.1 Note that May 7, 1988 corresponds to a Saturday, when markets were closed.
Following Rudebusch (1995), we use May 9, 1988 as the day when the target was
changed. Furthermore, for the target change of “early January 1989”, we assume
January 5 as the day when the target was changed. For the period 1990 onwards, the
series reported on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s website was
used.2 Following Poole et al. (2002), let us call “event days” the days on which the
FOMC meets (whether the target was changed or not) and the inter-meeting days on
which the target rate was changed. 
In the calculation of the transparency index, to avoid an artificial reduction in the
index, we use 360-day Fed funds and Treasury bill rates. For all other analyses in this
paper, however, rates are expressed on a 365-day basis. For the period under
consideration, the Fed has made some transparency-oriented changes. Some of the most
representative changes include: (i) October 19, 1989 when the Fed started the practice of
adjusting the funds rate target by 25 or 50 basis points,3 (ii) February 4, 1994 when the
                                                
1 Rudebusch (1995) also constructed a Federal funds target rate series. His series is available for the periods
1974-1979 and 1984-1992. Although Rudebusch’s series has been widely used by researchers, we use the
FOMC Secretariat’s series because it allows us to study the longest consecutive time period.
2 Alternatively, the series can be found in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website.  
3 According to Poole and Rasche (2003), this practice started in August 1989; however, we will follow
Sarno and Thornton’s (2003) estimation of October 1989, since it is likely that it took the market at least
two months to realize that the FOMC had enacted this practice. Also note that according to Rudebusch
(1995), the target change occurred on October 18, 1989, not on the 19. Since the Secretariat series are used
we will assume that the change started on the 19.
6Fed began announcing policy decisions after each FOMC meeting, (iii) August 19, 1997
when the FOMC started including a quantitative Fed funds target rate in its Directive to
the New York Fed Trading Desk and (iv) May 18, 1999 when the Fed extended its
explanations regarding policy decisions, and started including in press statements an
indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective developments (or the policy bias).
Furthermore, (v) on January 19, 2000, the FOMC issued a press statement explaining that
it would include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements, replacing the previous bias
statement.4 The practice was first implemented in the following FOMC meeting, on
February 2. Finally, (vi) since March 19, 2002, the Fed has included in FOMC statements
the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter members (if any). 5 
The index developed in this paper will be used to determine whether
transparency-oriented reforms at the Fed have indeed increased the market’s
understanding of Fed policies. Finally, we will also test whether monetary policy has
been more transparent during Alan Greenspan’s tenure (August 11, 1987 to the present). 
B. Assumptions
Since the index developed in this paper is market based, three important
assumptions should be made: (1) there is no uncertainty; (2) Fed funds and three-month
Treasury bill rates are cointegrated and finally, (3) the market participants are forward
looking in the sense of Lucas (1976). 
B-1 Assumption 1: There is no uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921), that
is, we distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Risk exists if agents can use historical
data to assign numerical probabilities to random events. However, random events to
which agents cannot assign probabilities are said to involve uncertainty. It should be
noted that there are periods of uncertainty in the sample period, specifically towards the
end of the Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s tenure and the start of the new
chairman’s tenure. In that period, because of the change in authority, market participants
could not easily understand or interpret the Fed signals. Other periods of uncertainty are
associated with the October 87 stock market crisis as well as September 2001. We will
adjust the index for these events. Note that we do not consider the Fed reaction relevant
                                                
4 Federal Reserve Board, “Modifications to the FOMC’s Disclosure Procedures”, January 19, 2000.
5 For a review of these changes, see Poole and Rasche (2003).
7to the Asian crisis as an uncertain event from the agents’ point of view since agents could
use the recent historical reaction of the Fed related to the October 87 crisis to calculate
the probability associated with what action the Fed was going to take.
B-2 Assumption 2: Since the construction of the monetary policy index in this
paper is based on the data of the short end of the yield curve we need short-term rates,
say, Fed fund and Treasury bill rates to be cointegrated. The existing literature provides
empirical evidence for this assumption. For example, Sarno and Thornton (2003) have
shown the Fed funds (FF) and 3-month Treasury bill (TB) rates are cointegrated.
Furthermore, the adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium largely occurs through the
movements in the FF rate rather than the TB rate. Note that, if two or more economic
variables are cointegrated, they should not diverge from each other by too great an extent
in the long run. It is possible, however, for such variables to drift apart in the short run or
according to seasonal factors, but if they continue to be too far apart in the long run, then
economic forces, such as a market mechanism or government intervention, will begin to
bring them back together [Granger (1986)]. Consequently, the exclusion of a short-run set
of variables which account for government interventions results in biased coefficients if,
in fact, some policy regime changes included in this set cause variables in the model to
move together over the long run. The existing literature ignores this fact. Consequently,
contrary to Sarno and Thornton (2003), we allow the short-run dynamic system to include
policy regime changes or other exogenous factors which affect such system.
Furthermore, in the error correction equations, again contrary to Sarno and
Thornton’s (2003) study, we allow the contemporaneous variable to affect the dependent
variable. This is due to the fact that as one would expect in an efficient market, like the
U.S. money market, a change in FF should result in a change in TB, if not immediately,
within a few minutes. Consequently, in the error correction equation, which reflects the
short-run relationship between FF and TB, one should include the contemporaneous
variable. 
We will test if two non-stationary series TB and FF are cointegrated6. We will use
λmax and Trace tests developed by Johansen and Juselius (1991) while allowing the
                                                
6 For the variable TB, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 5) is
0.0910 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is
8short-run dynamic system to be affected by day-of-the-week dummies and dummy
variables accounting for the internal and external shocks in the sample period, which
could affect the relationship between FF and TB. These shocks include the modification
in the reserve maintenance period from one week (for most large institutions) to two
weeks (for all institutions) on February 2, 1984, the appointment of Alan Greenspan as
the chairman of the Fed on August 11, 1987, the October 1987 stock market crisis, two
policy regime changes on October 19, 1989 and February 4, 1994, the Asian crisis in
1997 as well as five occasions on April 18, 1994; October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001;
April 18, 2001 and September 17, 2001 when the Fed changed the FF target outside the
regular meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.
Since October 1989, the Fed has followed the practice of changing the FF targets
by 25 or 50 basis points and since February 1994, with the five exceptions mentioned
above, the Fed has changed the FF target at regular meetings of the FOMC. Note that
since reserve requirements are binding at the end of the reserve maintenance period,
known as settlement Wednesday, the funds rate tends to be more volatile on settlement
Wednesdays [Sarno and Thornton (2003)]. Consequently, the FF time series are affected
by the increased volatility on settlement days. The variable to account for settlement
Wednesdays was, therefore, included. We will also include dummy variables to capture
well-known episodes of high volatility that occurred in 1985 (December 30 and 31) and
1986 (December 31). Finally, we adjusted the test results, following Cheung and
Lai (1993), for a potential bias possibly generated by small sample errors.
Table 1 reports the result of λmax and Trace tests for lag length of twenty days. A
twenty-lag length was needed in order to ensure that the error term is not autocorrelated.
The only non-congruency is non-normality. However, as it was mentioned by
                                                                                                                                                
0.56884. Both t statistics are less than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that TB has one unit root. For the
variable ∆TB, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 27.74
and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 62.19. Both
t statistics are more than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that ∆TB is stationary. For the variable FF, the
absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 10) is 0.5484 and the absolute
value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 1.57231. Both t statistics
again are less than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that FF also has a unit root. For the variable ∆FF, the
absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t statistic (for a lag length of 9) is 25.21 and the absolute
value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 86.86. Both t statistics are
more than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that ∆FF is stationary. Note that the lag length in all of these
9Johansen (1995), a departure from normality is not very serious in cointegration tests, see
also, e.g., Hendry and Mizon (1998). Both λmax and Trace tests reject r (degree of
cointegration) = 0 at 5% level while they cannot reject r ≤ 1, implying that r = 1. This
result confirms the finding of Sarno and Thornton (2003). The estimated long-run
relationship between TB and FF rates normalized on TB coefficient is:
TBt =  0.144 + 0.934*FFt. (1)
Table 1 about here
A Likelihood Ratio test [CHISQ(1) = 17.02, p-value = 0.00] rejects the null
hypothesis that the slope coefficient is one implying that there is no one-to-one
relationship between these rates over the long run. Furthermore, according to
[CHISQ(1) = 88.12, p-value = 0.00], we reject the null hypothesis that TB is weakly
exogenous for the long-run coefficients, while according to [CHISQ(1) = 1.21,
p-value = 0.27], we cannot reject the null hypothesis that FF is weakly exogenous for the
long-run coefficients. This implies that the first differences of TB do not contain
information about the long-run parameter, whereas the reverse is true for the first
differences of FF. 
We now need to investigate the long-run stability of the relationship. Figure 1
shows Hansen and Johansen’s (1993) LR test for the stability of the cointegration space
for the relationship. BETA_Z (solid line) pictures the actual disequilibrium as a function
of all short-run dynamics. At the same time, BETA_R (broken line) is corrected for the
short-run effects, including the policy effects, and shows the ‘clean’ disequilibrium. In
fact, it is the BETA_R series that is tested for stationarity and thus determines the number
of cointegration relationships in the maximum likelihood procedure [Hansen and
Juselius (1995)]. 
Figure 1 about here
As we can see from Figure 1, according to the LR test, the relationship is stable
over the long run when series are corrected for the short-run effects. Furthermore, when
the first five years are reserved for the initial estimate, even without correcting for the
short-run effects, the relationship is stable over the long run. In sum, in this section, we
                                                                                                                                                
tests was chosen according to the minimum of Akaike’s (1970, 1974) information criterion (AIC) and
Schwarz’s (1978) information criterion (SC).
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provide evidence for the validity of Assumption 2, i.e., there exists a long-run stable
relationship between FF and TB.
B-3 Assumption 3: Market participants are forward looking in the sense of
Lucas (1976). To provide an empirical evidence for this assumption we need to estimate
the error-correction model (conditional model) as well as the marginal model. 
B-3.1 Conditional and Marginal Models: Superexogeneity Test Result
Having established in the previous sub-section that a long-run relationship
between FF and TB exists, we need first to verify the direction of causality between these
two variables. To conduct the causality test, we will estimate:
∆TBt = β0 + ∑
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where ∆ before any variable means the first difference of that variable. Variables ETB
and EFF are the error terms from the long-run relationship when the coefficient of
variables TB and FF, respectively, is normalized. DUM = (Mt, Tt, WEDt, THt, D851231t,
D861231t, GREENt, OCT87t, ASIAt, TAt, TAFt, SWEDt, REMAt, D940418t, D970819t,
D981015t, D99518t, D000202t, D010103t, D010418t, D010917t, D020319t, EDAYt,
TARATEt), ut and vt are the disturbance terms which are assumed to be white noise with
zero mean.
The dummy variables Mt, Tt, WEDt and THt are for Mondays, Tuesdays,
Wednesdays and Thursdays, respectively. For example, M = 1 for Mondays and zero,
otherwise. Dummy variables D851231t and D861231t are equal to one on December 30
and 31, 1985 and December 31, 1986, respectively, and are equal to zero, otherwise.
These dummy variables are included to capture the high volatility of Fed funds rate on
those days. Dummy variable GREENt =1 since August 11, 1987 when Alan Greenspan
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was appointed chair of the Fed and is zero, otherwise. OCT87t and ASIAt are dummy
variables accounting for the October 87 and Asian crises, respectively. In both events,
central banks in industrial countries flooded the money markets with liquidity to ease the
downfall in the stock markets. The easing of the markets took at least until the end of
October of the year the crisis took place. 
Consequently, we created OCT87t = 1 for October 19 to 30, 1987 and zero,
otherwise, and ASIAt = 1 for October 17 to 30, 1997 and zero, otherwise. Dummy
variable TAt = 1 since February 4, 1994 and is equal to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable
TAFt = 1 since October 19, 1989 and is zero, otherwise. These two dummy variables
were created to account for the two policy regime changes, which have happened in the
sample period as explained before. Dummy variable SWEDt accounts for settlement days
on Wednesdays, i.e., it is equal to one on Wednesdays when it is a settlement day and
zero, otherwise. Dummy variable REMAt = 1 since February 2, 1984 when the reserve
maintenance period was modified from one week (for most large institutions) to two
weeks (for all institutions) and is zero, otherwise.
Dummy variable D970819t =1 since August 19, 1997, when the FOMC started
including a quantitative Fed funds target rate in its Directive to the New York Fed
Trading Desk, and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D99518t =1 since May 18, 1999,
when the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started including
in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective
developments (or the policy bias), and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D000202t = 1
since February 2, 2000, when the FOMC started to include a balance-of-risks sentence in
its statements replacing the previous bias statement, and zero, otherwise. Dummy
variable D020319t = 1 since March 19, 2002, when the Fed included in FOMC
statements the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter members (if any), and zero,
otherwise.
Dummy variables D940418t, D981015t, D010103t, D010418t and D010917t are
equal to one for April 18, 1994; October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; April 18, 2001 and
September 17, 2001 (when the Fed changed the FF target outside its regular meetings),
respectively, and zero otherwise. Dummy variable EDAYt is equal to one for the days
(“event”) when the Fed funds target rate was changed whether at a regularly scheduled
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FOMC meeting, or otherwise, and also for the days on which the FOMC met, but did not
change the target rate. It is equal to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable TARATE is equal
to one for the days when the Federal funds target rate actually was changed and is equal
to zero, otherwise. These days can be among the regularly scheduled FOMC meeting
dates or other days. Note that TARATE is a subset of EDAY, as it excludes the days
when FOMC met, but did not change the target. Note that we also assume the forecast
error may be different in the “event” days and days when the target rate was changed. β's,
Φ’s, α’s, Ψ’s, δ’s, η’s, γ and ζ are constant parameters.
We will conduct the Wald test for the following hypotheses:
H1: β1 = β2 = … = βk = 0, H2: Φ1 = Φ2 = … = Φk = 0, H3: α1 = α2 = … = αk = 0 and
H4: δ1 = δ2 = … = δk = 0. If we can reject H1, H2 and H3, and fail to reject H4, then FF
Granger causes TB, provided we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient
of at least one of the error terms in Equation (2) (i.e., ψ1i, ψ2i, ψ3i and ψ4i for all i = 1 to k)
is zero. If we can reject H1, H3 and H4, and fail to reject H2, then TB Granger causes FF,
provided we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of at least one of the
error terms in Equation (3) (i.e., η1i, η2i, η3i and η4i for all i = 1 to k) is zero. Note that in
this case the changes in TB contain information on changes in FF. This implies that
market participants can, on average, predict the Fed’s decision on target changes. If none
of these hypotheses can be rejected, then there is a bi-directional causality between these
rates. If agents ignore a small deviation from equilibrium, while reacting substantially to
large ones, the error-correction equation is non-linear [Kia (2003a)]. Consequently, we
follow Kia and allow all kinds of non-linearity in our error correction models (2) and (3).
In fact, a non-linear error-correction model, in a restricted form, was originally
developed by Escribano (1985). This model was used, among others, by Hendry and
Ericsson (1991), and recently Teräsvirta and Eliasson (2001) developed two unrestricted
versions of the model. Moreover, Sarno and Thornton (2003) developed a restricted
non-linear ECM between FF and TB. To correct for overlapping observations and
heteroscedasticity, Newey and West’s (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average was
used. In order to ensure that the causality tests are not biased or lack power because of an
inappropriate choice of lag length, we will conduct the causality test for k= the lag length
= 1, 5, 10 and 20. Table 2 reports causality tests for each of the TB and FF variables.
13
Table 2 about here
At least the coefficient of one error correction terms was found to be statistically
significant for both equations (2) and (3) (the full estimation results are available upon
request). According to the Wald test results on Null H2, FF does Granger cause TB at the
conventional level of significance. The result is consistent for all lag length k. Moreover,
according to the Wald test result on Null H4, TB does not Granger cause FF at the
conventional level of significance. The only exception is at non-optimal lag length of k=5
and k=10. Consequently, the direction of causality is one way and it is from FF to TB.
This result implies that the Fed has been following a discretionary monetary policy
during our sample period. Furthermore, FF is strongly exogenous for TB.
Having established that the direction of causality is from FF to TB, we need to
concentrate on the ECM for TB that is implied by our cointegrating vector. Using this
ECM, we can investigate if market participants are forward looking, i.e., expectations are
formed rationally. Consequently, its parameters are no longer invariant to the process of
forcing variables as was mentioned by Lucas (1976). Namely, at least one of the
parameters varies with changes in the expectation process. This requires that at least one
variable in this equation fails to be superexogenous in the sense of Engle et al. (1983) and
Engle and Hendry (1993). 
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Error-correction (conditional) model (ECM)
Our ECM for TB is:
∆TBt = β0 + ∑
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∑
=
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−−ψ
k
1i
3
it
2
iti4 )ETB)(ETB( + DUMt’ζ + ut, (4)
where the only difference between Equation (4) and Equation (2) is that the
contemporaneous variable ∆FFt also appears as an independent variable. Table 3 reports
the parsimonious error-correction (conditional) model for TB for the initial lag length of
k=20. The estimation method is Least Squared. According to diagnostic tests reported in
the last row of Column 2 of the table, the error term is both autocorrelated and
heteroscedastic and, therefore, standard errors are corrected by using Newey and
West’s (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average. 
Table 3 about here
According to the Hansen’s (1992) stability Li test, for the null hypothesis that the
estimated coefficient is stable, reported in Column 3 of the table, all coefficients are
stable. However, as we would expect due to overlapping observations and
heteroscedasticity, the variance is not stable. Consequently, the joint Hansen’s (1992)
stability Lc test result, which is equal to 12.11 (p-value=0.00), rejects the null of joint
stability of the coefficients together with the estimated associated variance.
As the results of the ECMs indicate, the short-run relationship between TB and FF
is non linear implying that a small deviation from the equilibrium may be ignored, but
market participants react substantially to a large deviation. According to this result
(second column of the table), a deviation from the long-run equilibrium takes a day to
return to equilibrium while there are some tendencies toward further deviation from
equilibrium after twelve and fifteen days. Note that the sum of the positive coefficients of
non-linear error term is smaller than the negative (error correcting) coefficient. None of
the dummy variables was found to be statistically significant in Equation (4) and so they
were dropped. Note that as it was shown earlier in this section the contemporaneous
variable ∆FFt in Equation (4) is strongly exogenous for ∆TBt. Consequently, it is a valid
conditioning regressor in Equation (4). Moreover, we will see in the next subsection that
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in Equation (4) the contemporaneous variable ∆FFt is also weakly exogenous for the
coefficients of interest in the sense of Engle et al. (1983), Engle and Hendry (1993) as
well as Hendry and Richard (1983). In the next sub-section, we will concentrate on our
formal test for superexogeneity and invariance hypothesis associated with our conditional
model. 
Marginal Model and Superexogeneity Test Results
To formulate the superexogeneity and invariance hypothesis, assume the
information set It includes the past values of ∆TBt and ∆FFt as well as the current and
past values of other valid conditioning variables included in Equation (4). Define,
respectively, the conditional moments of ∆TBt and ∆FFt as
ηTBt=E(∆TBt│It), ηFFt=E(FFt│It), σtTB=E[(∆TBt – ηTBt)2│It] and σtFF=E[(∆FFt – ηFFt)2│It],
and let σtTBFF=E[(∆TBt – ηTBt)(∆FFt – ηFFt)│It]. Consider the joint distribution of ∆TBt
and ∆FFt conditional on information set It to be normally distributed with mean ηt=[ηTBt,
ηFFt] and a non-constant error covariance matrix ∑ = ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
σ
σ
σ
σ
FF
TBFF
FFTB
TB
. Then, following
Engle et al. (1983), Engle and Hendry (1993) and Psaradakis and Sola (1996), we can
write the relationship between ∆TBt and ∆FFt as:
∆TBt = α0 + ψ0 ∆FFt + (δ0 - ψ0) (∆FFt – ηFFt) + δ1 σtFF (∆FFt – ηFFt) + ψ1 (ηFFt)2 
+ ψ2 (ηFFt)3 + ψ3 σtFF ηFFt + ψ4 σtFF (ηFFt)2 + ψ5 σtFF (ηFFt)2  + ψ6 DevFFt  
+ z’tγ + ut, (5)
where α0, ψ0, ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, ψ4, ψ5, ψ6, δ0 and δ1 are regression coefficients of ∆TBt on ∆FFt
conditional on z’tγ where z includes past values ∆TBt, ∆FFt and other valid conditioning
variables included in Equation (4). The error term ut is assumed, as before, to be
heteroscedastic (due to the overlapping observations), normally, identically and
independently distributed. Because the error is heteroscedastic the term DevFF (= the
deviation of the variance of the error term from a five-period ARCH error of ∆FF) is
added, see Engle and Hendry (1993). 
Note that ∆FFt is the control/target variable that is subject to policy interventions.
Although the parameter of ∆FFt is assumed to be constant over the sample period, but it
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is possible that this parameter changes [Lucas (1976)] under interventions affecting DGP
(data generating) process of ∆FFt. In this case, agents have a forward-looking behavior
and the conditional model (4) is not policy invariant. Hence, the parameters of interest in
the analysis will be δ and ψ in the behavioral relationship (5). Under the null of weak
exogeneity, δ0-ψ0=0. Under the null of invariance, ψ1=ψ2=ψ3=ψ4= ψ5=ψ6=0 in order to
have ψ0=ψ. Finally, if we assume that σtFF has distinct values over different, but clearly
defined regimes, then under the null of constancy of δ, we need δ1=0. If these entire
hypotheses are accepted the equation will be reduced to Equation (4), and the agents in
the money market are not forward looking. In other words, expectations are not formed
rationally. It should also be mentioned that “superexogeneity is sufficient but not a
necessary condition for valid inference under intervention” [Engle et al. (1983), p. 284].
This is due to the fact that estimable models with invariant parameters, but with no
weakly exogenous variables are easily formulated. 
For the superexogeneity test, we need to specify the stochastic mechanism, which
generates our contemporaneous variable ∆FFt, i.e., the marginal model. The marginal
model is, in fact, the data generating process of ∆FFt. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report
the marginal model. The estimation method, similar to the conditional model, is Least
Squared, where standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Diagnostic tests reported in the last row of Column 4 of the table suggest that, as one
would expect, due to overlapping observations, the error term is both autocorrelated and
ARCH heteroscedastic. 
According to Hansen’s (1992) stability Li test reported in Column 5 of Table 3, all
coefficients are stable. However, again as we would expect, due to overlapping
observations and heteroscedasticity, the variance is not stable. Consequently, joint
Hansen’s (1992) stability Lc test result, which is equal to 10.97 (p-value=0.00), rejects the
null of joint stability of the coefficients together with the estimated associated variance.
The estimated model seems a reasonable marginal model for the analogues of ηFF.
Based on the significance of the dummy coefficients, there is strong evidence for
a structural break due to the “event” days, the policy regime changes of February 2, 1984,
February 4, 1994 and March 19, 2002 as well as April 18, 2001 (when the Fed changed
the FF target outside its regular meetings) and October 1987 crisis. The instability of the
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marginal model implies that the parameters of the associated conditional models will not
be policy invariant when economic agents are forward-looking. Table 4 provides some
evidence on this issue. 
From the estimated marginal model, estimates of ηFF and σtFF were calculated. As
for σtFF, since the error is heteroscedastic, according to ARCH test, a five-period ARCH
error, therefore, was estimated. We also constructed DevFF as differences between the
variance of the error term of the marginal model and the variance constructed by ARCH
estimation. All of these constructed variables were then included in the ECM,
Equation (5). The estimation results on these constructed variables are given in Table 4.
The estimated method is Least Squared where standard errors, as before, are corrected for
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, using Newey and West’s (1987) robusterror for
5-order moving average.
Table 4 about here
The individual Chi-squared test is on the null hypothesis that the coefficient of
each variable is zero. The Chi-squared or F-test on the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of all constructed variables are jointly zero is given in the last row of the
table. As the estimation result in Table 4 shows, the joint F-test (or Chi-Squared-test) on
the null hypothesis that coefficients of these constructed variables are jointly zero is
rejected, indicating that these variables together should be included. This result
immediately implies that the contemporaneous variable (∆FFt) in the conditional model,
reported in Table 3, failed to be superexogenous, i.e., agents are forward looking and
expectations are formed rationally.
Since the coefficient of (∆FFt –ηFF) is statistically insignificant, ∆FFt, as it would
be expected, is weakly exogenous.7 Furthermore, the coefficient of σFF(∆FFt –ηFF) is also
statistically insignificant, implying that the null of constancy cannot be rejected for this
variable. However, since the coefficient of σFF ηFF and DevFF is statistically significant at
the conventional level, the null of invariance with respect to policy changes is violated.
Consequently, we reject the null of invariance, while accepting weak exogeneity and
constancy conditions for our contemporaneous variable. Note that constancy and
invariance are different concepts. Parameters could vary over time, but be invariant with
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respect to policy changes. It should also be noted that since ∆FF is weakly exogenous and
its coefficient is constant, the inference on the parameters in the agents’ model (ECM) is
efficient.
However, as it was mentioned by Engle and Hendry (1993), we need all three
conditions to be satisfied in order to ensure superexogeneity. The failure of the invariance
condition, therefore, justifies the result of the joint F-test (or Chi-Squared-test) on the null
hypothesis that all coefficients of the constructed variables are jointly zero. Namely, in
general, we reject the null hypothesis that ∆FF is superexogenous. That is, although the
coefficient of ∆FF in our ECM is weakly exogenous and constant over the sample period,
any change in the regime affecting money markets in the U.S. influences economic
agents’ investment behavior. 
In fact, since most policy rules relate to past information about the economy, the
possibility of a policy variable, like the Fed funds rate, being superexogenous seems
unlikely. Consequently, a change in the monetary policy, which alters the process that the
control variable ∆FF is formed, will affect investment decisions made by economic
agents in the money market in the United States. Namely, the agents in this market are
forward looking. Furthermore, since the contemporaneous variable in the ECM reported
in Table 3 is weakly exogenous, it can be treated as though it is fixed in repeated
samples. Moreover, since the Fed funds rate is also strongly exogenous, the ECM can be
used for prediction. In sum, in this section we provided evidence to support the validity
of the underlying assumptions behind the construction of the indexes to be developed in
this paper. 
III. A Money-Market Measure of the Transparency of Fed
Policymaking
In this section, we will construct an index of the transparency of monetary policy.
Our index is based on the degree to which money market participants anticipate the
decisions taken at the regularly scheduled FOMC meetings (whether a target change
occurred or not), as well as those (target changes) made outside these meetings. We will
                                                                                                                                                
7  Note that FF is a monetary authorities control variable.
19
first introduce the theoretical justification for our index and then we will construct both
our formal index and an extended version. 
A. A Monetary Policy Index: Theoretical Justification
By monetary policy transparency, following Sundararajan et al. (2003, p. 5), we
mean “[…] an environment in which the objectives of the policy; its legal, institutional,
and economic framework; policy decisions and their rationale; data and information
related to monetary and financial policies; and the accountability of the policymaking
body are provided to the public in an understandable, accessible and timely basis.” Under
this definition, there is an absence of asymmetric information between monetary policy
makers and other economic agents. The implementation of the monetary policy can be
made public in one or more of the following ways: remarks of the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve as well as other senior management of the Fed, testimony before the
House and Senate Banking Committee, the release of the Beige book, the minutes of the
Federal Open Market Committee meetings, changes in reserve requirements, changes in
the discount rate and open market operations. 
Assume there is no uncertainty, FF and TB are cointegrated and market
participants are forward looking. The difference between these two rates (Dif) is positive
since the rate on non-collateralized overnight interbank loans (Fed funds) is risky while
loans to Federal Government (Treasury bills) are risk-free. Thus, Dif measures the default
risk minus maturity risk premiums. Suppose further that there is no expected significant
change in the structure of the U.S. banking industry (i.e., risk associated with interbank
loans) and/or in the credibility of the U.S. government.
Under these assumptions, there is no reason to believe that Dif deviates from its
equilibrium value (its trend) unless Fed actions, and/or other exogenous shocks, change
one or both of these rates in a different proportion. However, under a forward-looking
assumption (rational expectations), the deviations of Dif from its trend should be short-
lived if there is an absence of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers
and other economic agents. This is due to the fact that such deviations lead to potential
arbitrage or speculative profits. Such potential profits result in arbitrage and/or
speculative activities until the deviation of Dif from its equilibrium value (trend) is
eliminated. Thus we can establish the following:
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Proposition: Because FF and TB are cointegrated and money market participants
are forward looking, the life of deviations of Dif from its trend value depends on the
degree of monetary policy transparency provided there is no uncertainty. The deviations
are short-lived if monetary policy is highly transparent and vice versa.
Figure 2 about here
Let us consider Figure 2. In this figure FF is the Fed funds rate, TB is the 3-month
Treasury bill rate and Dift (= FFt – TBt) is assumed to have a trend value or equilibrium
level, Tdift. The upper panel shows the movements of the FF and TB rates. The lower
panel shows the movements of Dif around its trend or equilibrium level. Suppose full
certainty (100% transparency) on monetary policy exists, i.e., the Fed fully conveys its
private information on monetary policy decisions to the market. Let us start from
equilibrium, i.e., Dift=Tdift, and assume at time t the Fed conducts a “discretionary”
monetary policy and tightens the market by, say, an outright sale of Treasury bills in
order to increase the target rate from FF0 to FF1 at time t+1, the target-change day or the
day of the FOMC meeting.8 There will be a drain in reserves. Banks compete for
interbank funds and the Federal funds rate will go up. This will lead to an increase in the
Federal funds-Treasury bill rate differential, Dift. Banks will also sell their Treasury bills
or other liquid assets to obtain the required liquidity and so put a further downward
pressure on Treasury bill prices. Since we assumed full monetary policy transparency, the
market participants, knowing the intention of the Fed, will also sell Treasury bills. These
speculative/arbitrage activities will continue until the interbank and the money markets
are again in equilibrium. At such a time, we would expect, when full transparency exists,
Dift+1 and Tdif to almost coincide.
The Fed’s action and the subsequent market’s reaction will continue until the next
target-change day or FOMC meeting when the Fed’s desired target rate (FF1) is officially
announced. According to this analysis, one would expect under full monetary policy
transparency, deviations of Dif from its average/trend (or equilibrium) to be temporary.
The solid curve in the lower panel of Figure 2 depicts such movements. 
                                                
8 Note that a “discretionary” conduct of policy means that the central bank is free at any time to alter its
instrument setting instead of complying with a rule. In an “interest-rate smoothing” regime the central bank
follows a “rule-based” policy. However, the discretionary conduct of policy also includes interest-rate
smoothing, as the central bank is free to react at any time to the movements of the market.
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If we assume there is a lack of (less than 100%) monetary policy transparency,
then deviations of Dif from Tdif last longer and may not be temporary, see the broken
curve in the panel. The reason is that the forward-looking market participants could easily
be confused by the action of the Fed and may overreact/underreact in the right or the
opposite direction where the authorities wish the market to go. This may make the life of
the central bankers more difficult and may result in more activities by the Fed to correct
the situation. For example, given our assumption that market participants are forward
looking and so their behaviors are not policy invariant, an outright sale of Treasury bills
by the Fed may be considered an interest rate smoothing action by the market and may
lead the participants to purchase Treasury bills in order to sell them at a higher price
when the Fed starts buying them back. This will result in widening the deviations of Dif
from Tdif. Consequently, any |Dt| — where Dt = Dift – Tdift-1 — is an indication of the
monetary policy transparency, a small |Dt| means a high transparency and vice versa. 
Note that we are assuming the market is not efficient in the strong form, i.e., the
market participants do not know Fed’s private information before being publicized. If the
market is efficient in the strong form, market participants will, on average, perceive the
target rate in advance, and if there exists potential for arbitrage/speculative profits,
arbitrageurs and speculators will trade until potential profits are eliminated. Namely,
arbitrage and speculative activities will eliminate any Dt, which is associated with
potential arbitrage/speculative profits. If the market is not efficient in the strong form,
arbitrageurs and speculators must be given inside information through Fed’s
signals/operations.
Let us now assume the Fed is following an “interest-rate smoothing” policy.
Starting from full monetary policy transparency and equilibrium, suppose market
participants, due to some signals from the Fed and/or some economic shocks, which
caused movements in the equilibrium interest rate, expect a positive change in the target
rate. A higher expected rate in the near future creates potential for arbitrage/speculative
profits. Profit maximization leads arbitrageurs/speculators (investors) to operate along the
short end of the yield curve by selling their three-month bills and buying very short-term
bills or lending overnight. This action leads to an increase in TB and a reduction in D. To
moderate the reduction in the overnight rate as well as to confirm its intention, the Fed
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will put an upward pressure on non-borrowed reserves by selling bills. The Fed’s action
leads to an upward pressure on FF. Arbitrage and speculative activities as well as the Fed
reactions continue until the money market is again in equilibrium.
As before, one would expect D, under full monetary policy transparency, to
approach zero at equilibrium when the potential for arbitrage/speculative profits is
eliminated. In this case, the magnitude of D, in absolute value, is small and short-lived as
Dif represented by the solid curve shows in Figure 2. Clearly, when monetary policy
transparency is low, as the movements of Dif represented by the broken curve show, D is
high in absolute value and is long-lived. Note that again even while monetary policy
transparency from the central bank point of view may remain constant, the market
perception of a monetary policy action may change when such an action is conducted.
Let us consider another case of 100% monetary transparency. Suppose the Fed
changes the target rate and hints that this rate will soon be changed (increased) again, say,
within the next three months. Let us start from equilibrium, where D=0. To avoid the
capital loss resulting from the increase, holders of three-month Treasury bills sell their
bills and invest in shorter-term assets or in the overnight market. This leads to an increase
in TB and a fall in FF, i.e., Dif falls and |Dt|>0. To moderate the fall in FF and make its
intention clear, the Fed puts an upward pressure on non-borrowed reserves, say, by an
outright sale of Treasury bills. Given the fact that bills are cheap (TB is high), instead of
selling bills, banks compete for interbank funds and put an extra upward pressure on FF.
Market actions and the fed reactions continue until equilibrium is again achieved (D=0).
Specifically, there are enough speculative and arbitrage activities by the forward-looking
market participants to make deviations of Dif from Tdif short lived along the solid line in
the lower panel of Figure 2 so that at the time of the target rate announcement |Dt|=0 or is
very close to zero (i.e., an indication of 100% or very close to 100% transparency). Thus,
when FF and TB are cointegrated and market participants are forward looking, |Dt| can
capture a market-based monetary policy transparency in the absence of uncertainty.
In sum, so far, based on some conditions (assumptions) of which their validity
was verified in the previous section, we have established a theoretical justification behind
our index. Such an index, contrary to the existing market-based indexes in the literature,
e.g., Howells and Mariscal (2002), is dynamic and includes expected policy actions. It
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should be mentioned that one may argue that Dif may deviate from its trend not only
because of speculative and arbitrage activities of the market participants based on their
expectations (understanding) on future Fed actions, but also based on other factors, such
as the mobility of capital and/or the federal government debt per GDP.
As it was mentioned earlier in this section, Dif measures default risk premium
minus maturity risk premium. There is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence, to the
best knowledge of the author, to believe that these premiums deviate on average from
their equilibrium values (trends) when the structure of the interbank market or the
credibility of the U.S. government in servicing the outstanding debt or expected future
debt remains constant. This is especially true at high frequency observations. It is,
however, possible the credibility of a bank or some banks in the interbank market
changes. But FF is the weighted average of the interbank rates, which should not be
changed as one or some banks pay more on their loans while in the meantime some other
banks pay less. An overall banking crisis, if it exists in the sample, should, of course, be
dummied out. 
One may, however, argue that the deviation of Dif from its trend can be a function
of the mobility of capital or the size of the debt at high frequency data even for a large
country like the United States. Before such a scenario can be investigated, it should be
noted that the mobility of capital or the size of the debt as well as any other internal or
external shocks, aside from the expectations on Fed activities, does influence FF and TB
in the same proportion, especially at high frequency observations, provided the structure
of interbank market remains the same. To provide some empirical evidence for this
argument, we first investigate the Granger causality between the change in the log of the
US exchange rate (ge) and the gap between Dif and its forty-day (to capture two months)
moving average (cdif), i.e. gapt = Dift – cdift-1. This test is based on the assumption that
the exchange rate (Japanese Yens per US dollar) movements at high frequency data
capture the mobility of capital. Then we will investigate the Granger causality between
gap and the change in the log of debt-GDP ratio (gdy), where to generate a daily series of
gdy, an interpolation of these series from quarterly series was computed.
All of these variables are stationary. The stationarity test results are available
upon request. Note also that in all of these tests we conditioned the dependent variables
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on the variables included in the set DUM, already defined in the paper. We will use
Akaike’s (1970, 1974) information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s (1978) information
criterion (SC), the generalized cross validation (GCV) method developed by Craven and
Wahba (1979), used by Engel et al. (1986), as well as Hannan and Quinn’s (1979)
criterion (HQ) to determine the lag length (k) for a global lag length of 60 days to
incorporate a three-month period.
According to the lag specification tests, the optimum k for all these criteria was
found to be one. The Wald test (adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) result
[Chi-Squared(1)=0.68 with significance level 0.41] strongly rejects the null hypothesis
that ge Granger causes gap and [Chi-Squared(1)= 0.57 with significance level 0.45]
strongly rejects the Null hypothesis that gyd Granger causes gap. Consequently, we
conclude that Dif deviates from its trend only because of speculative and arbitrage
activities of the market participants based on their expectations (understanding) on future
Fed actions. 
B. Basic Index
The index will be constructed in three steps:
(1) We identify “event days” as the days on which the Federal funds target
rate was changed whether at a regularly scheduled FOMC meeting or outside the
meetings and also the days on which the FOMC met but did not change the target rate.
When the FOMC meetings took place over two days, we choose the second day of the
meeting as the event day. 
Our first event date in the sample is October 5, 1982, the first meeting of the
FOMC during our period of study. On this date, the FOMC adopted a target for the
Federal funds rate of 10%. Our second event date is October 8, 1982, when the FOMC
changed the target (to 9.5%) outside a regularly scheduled meeting. Our last event date is
December 9, 2003, the last meeting of the FOMC within our sample period. On this
occasion, the Fed left the target rate unchanged. In total, we have 227 event days.
(2) For each event day, we calculate |Dt| = |Dift - Tdift-1|, where Tdift-1 is the
average of Dift between two event dates. Namely, we calculate daily observations of the
absolute value of the deviation of FF minus TB from the trend differential at each event
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date.9 For example, for the event day of October 8, 1982, Tdifj-1, as the arithmetic
average of Dift for t = 5-Oct-82, 6-Oct-82, 7-Oct-82, is Tdifj-1 = (2.13 + 1.40 + 2.06)/3
=1.863333, while, |Dj| = |Difj - Tdifj-1| = |1.88 - 1.863333| = 0.016667.
(3) We consider the maximum/minimum of |Dt|, at the event dates in the
sample period, to be the least/most transparent monetary policy over the period, and we
calculate the index as follows:
Tt = transparency index = 
t|D |
100
e
. (6)
If |D| = 0%, we will have T = 100%, the highest transparency degree and for |D| = 10%
we will have T = 0.0045% which may be considered zero transparency for the case of the
United States. Consequently, our calculated index for the first event day in the sample
period (October 8, 1982) is 100/e|0.016667| = 98.347. In sum, when the Treasury bill market
is not efficient in a strong form, forward-looking market participants can completely
perceive the target rate, only due to 100% transparency, so that e|D| = 1. See Figure 3 for
the annual average of the basic transparency index. 
Figure 3 about here
Since we assumed no uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921), to make the index
unbiased, Figure 3 has been adjusted for the uncertainty created by the October 87 stock
market crisis and before the start of Chairman Greenspan’s tenure in 1987. The index in
this figure is also adjusted for the uncertainty created by the September 2001 crisis.10 For
all other analyses in this paper the raw index is used. For instance, for the entire sample,
index T averages 83.64%. The maximum value of T is 100 (full transparency or full
anticipation) and it occurs on September 26, 1995. The least transparent outcome
(T = 23.42%) occurs, early on in the sample, on December 16, 1987 while a fairly low
value for T also occurs on September 17, 2001. These two low values are clearly due to
                                                
9 Although it would be more intuitive to calculate Tdif as the daily geometric average (as opposed to the
arithmetic average), about 10% of the time Dif is a negative value and often the number of days between
event days is an even number. Furthermore, consistent approximations of the geometric average are not
possible for all dates in the sample. To make the measure consistent across all observations we use simple
arithmetic averages.  Another potential problem with geometric averages occurs when the differential is
zero or close to zero, since in such a case the geometric mean artificially drives the trend to zero.
10  It should be noted while after September 11, 2001 market participants knew the Fed would ease policy,
but a great deal of uncertainty existed on the magnitude of the expansion as well as on the economy.
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the uncertainty created by the events of the stock market crisis in 1987 and of September
2001, respectively. 
It should be again noted that the index developed in this paper is market based. It,
therefore, reflects what market participants perceive from hints, actions or reactions (to
exogenous shocks) of the monetary authorities and not what these authorities intend to
convey to the market. Specifically, the public availability of the data does not suffice to
achieve transparency. What is important is how agents manipulate the data to extract
useful information. In other words, a market-based measure of monetary transparency
depends on the understanding (manipulation) of the data. Namely, market participants
may observe a different norm/direction in the policy during the day or within a month or
a period than what the central bank actually follows. Furthermore, even though monetary
authorities believe they have been as transparent as before, the index developed in this
paper reflects changes in what market participants understand from policy regime
changes. Consequently, a market-based transparency index may fluctuate as policy
regime changes or when there are exogenous shocks to the system when agents are
forward looking. This can be clearly seen in our index (Figure 3).
As explained in Section II, during the sample period there have been policy
regime changes, which, without any doubt, resulted in a higher monetary policy
transparency in the United States. These changes occurred on August 11, 1987, October
19, 1989, February 4, 1994, August 19, 1997, May 18, 1999, February 2, 2000 and,
March 19, 2002. We will use our index to determine whether the above transparency-
oriented changes at the Fed have indeed increased the market’s understanding of Fed
policies. 
Since the basic index, T, has irregular intervals a quarterly sample out of the
observations was constructed. Namely, we took the average of the index in each quarter.
According to both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, variable T is stationary.11
Table 5 reports the means with their standard errors (adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity) of the index before and after each policy regime change. All means
                                                
11 The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t was estimated to be 6.77 [more than 2.89 (5%
critical value)] and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t was estimated to be 7.12
[more than 2.89 (5% critical value)]. Both of these tests were done for a lag length of zero (where, for a
global lag of 20 days, the AIC and SC criteria are at their minimum).
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are statistically significant. The above policy regime changes resulted in positive and
statistically significant changes in the transparency index. Consequently, according to
these results, the index developed in this paper clearly captures the increase in the
monetary policy transparency created by the above policy regime changes. Namely, the
index developed in this paper fully reflects a transparency index. 
Table 5 about here
C. Extension of the Index
Being a variable with unequal intervals, the basic index developed in this paper
can be used in studies with quarterly or less frequent data. Alternatively, it restricts the
researchers to specific techniques of estimation, such as the factor-model approach which
allows researchers to deal systematically with data irregularities [e.g., Stock and
Watson (2002)]. To make the measure suitable for all kinds of research, using the above
methodology and logic, we extend our index as follows. For the event days, the index is
defined exactly as before [Equation (6)]. For all other days, we compute an estimated or
forecasted value of tD , called tDˆ , where tDˆ  = |Dift - Adift|, with Dift is defined as before
(= FFt - TBt) and with Adift = n
Dif
j
1i
i-t∑
= , where j is the last event day and n is the number
of days since the last event day. Given tDˆ , we calculate an index for non-event days tTˆ ,
t
ˆ|D |
tTˆ 100 / e= . (7)
Note that our index tTˆ  is dynamic and also continuous in the sense that we can
construct it for intraday minute or even shorter-interval, instead of daily, observations. It
should be mentioned that there are several important characteristics of the Federal funds
market (e.g., the last day of the reserve maintenance period, the last day of quarters, years
and months, etc.) that lead to predictable movements in the funds rate without any impact
on three-month Treasury bill rate. The daily index, consequently, can be affected, mostly,
negatively by these characteristics. To avoid a biased calculation of the daily index, we
will filter (dummy out) the daily index for these features of the Fed funds market.
To further clarify how the index is constructed on non-event days consider once
again the first two event dates in the sample i = October 5, 1982 and j = October 8, 1982,
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and assume that we want tTˆ  for t = October 7, 1982. We first compute
Adift = n
Dif
j
1i
i-t∑
= = (2.13+1.40)/2 = 1.765. We then compute tDˆ  = | Dift - Adift| = |2.06-
1.765| = 0.295, and 0.295tTˆ 100 / e 74.453159= = . Figure 4 depicts the annual average of
the extended index. Note that for event days the extended index is given by tT  and for
non-event days, by tTˆ . On average, for the entire sample period, the extended
transparency index equals 85.68% which is close to the estimated average of the basic
index (83.64%). 
Figure 4 about here
As Figure 4 shows, the extended index is smoother than the basic index as it
contains more information. However, these two indices show almost the same
movements during the sample period, except in 1998 when they deviate from each other
by 10%. We will again investigate, using our daily observations and extended index,
whether the regime changes of August 11, 1987, October 19, 1989, February 4, 1994,
August 19, 1997, May 18, 1999, February 2, 2000, and March 19, 2002 have resulted in
more transparency (as measured by our extended index). According to both
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, our extended index Tˆ  is stationary. 12 Table 5
also reports the means with their standard errors (adjusted for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity) of the daily index before and after each policy regime change. As the
results reported in the table indicate, all means and their changes are positive and
statistically significant, confirming the earlier findings that these policy regime changes
resulted in a higher monetary policy transparency. Furthermore, the results imply that the
daily monetary policy transparency index developed in this paper also fully and clearly
captures the increase in the monetary policy transparency created by the above policy
regime changes. Namely, the daily index developed in this paper also fully reflects a
monetary policy transparency index. It should be emphasized again, that as both
                                                
12 The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t was estimated to be 41.46 [more than 2.86 (5%
critical value)] and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t for the lag length of 4 (where,
for a global lag of 20 days, the AIC and SC criteria are at their minimum) was estimated to be 42.32 [more
than 2.86 (5% critical value)].
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developed indexes reflect, the view of the market, based on the actions of the central
bank, could rapidly change if agents are forward looking. Both indexes are based on two
important assumptions: FF and TB are cointegrated and market participants are forward
looking, i.e., expectations are formed rationally and the behaviors of participants in the
overnight money market in the United States are not policy invariant. We provided
empirical evidence for these two important assumptions in the previous section. 
IV. Risk and Volatility in the Money Market: Further Evaluation of
the Index
It is commonly believed [e.g., Thornton (1996) and Blinder et al. (2001)] that
monetary policy transparency leads to lower uncertainty and risk in financial markets. If
our indexes, both the basic and the extended, are a true proxy for monetary policy
transparency in the United States, it should have a negative relationship with the risk
observed in the money market in the country. This section is devoted to such an
investigation. We will first test if the index has a negative impact on the risk in the money
market. We will conduct this test by using the rational expectations model of the term
structure. The test is based on the idea that the more the Fed conveys its private
information to the market the higher the forecast ability of the market participants will be
and, consequently, they will demand a lower risk premium. We then test if our index has
any impact on the volatility in the money market in the United States. This test is based
on the idea that a higher volatility of the return in the money market is associated with a
higher risk in the market and, therefore, if a more transparent monetary policy results in a
lower volatility it will help to reduce risk in the money market. 
A. Risk in the Money Market and the Index
The pure (rational) expectations model of the term structure (RE), in which the
term premia are set identically to zero, implies that at any moment in time, the expected
TB, for example, prevailing at the beginning of three months from now (1+3TBte) should
be equal to the implied forward three-month Treasury bill rate (FTBt) in the absence of
term premium or any other risk. From the first statement of the theory [e.g., Van Horne
(1965)], we know that FTBt = [(1 + TB6t/4)2/(1 + TBt/4)] – 1. Here TB6 is the six-month
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spot rate and we assume both six- and three-month spot Treasury bill rates are at the
annual rate. Specifically, we can write:
1+3TBte = FTBt. (8)
If this equality is violated, investors and speculators, trade three- and six-month
Treasury bills, to capture potential arbitrage profits, until Equation (8) is restored. For
example, if 1+3TBte > FTBt speculators will sell their six-month bills and buy three-month
bills, pushing the price of six-month bills down (TB6t will go up) and increasing the price
of three-month bills up (TB3t will go down). This speculative activity continues until the
potential for speculative profits is eliminated, i.e., 1+3TBte is again equal to FTBt.
Furthermore, by orthogonal decomposition at any given time t we have:
TBt = TBte + Vt, (9)
where Vt is the agents’ forecast error in the absence of transaction costs, risk and other
premia (including term premium, liquidity premium and reinvestment premium).
Substituting (8) in (9) yields:
TBt+1 = FTBt + Vt+1. (10)
If the market is efficient (expectations are rational), TBt+1 - FTBt = Vt+1 is stationary [e.g.,
Campbell and Shiller (1987)] and, in the absence of risk premia and transaction costs, has
a zero mean. The error term (Vt) is stationary as both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron
tests reject the null hypothesis that Vt is not stationary. The absolute value of the
augmented Dickey Fuller t was estimated to be 6.87 and the absolute value of the
Phillips-Perron non-parametric t for the lag length of 4 was estimated to be 7.20, both
t statistics results are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value).13 However, the mean of Vt
over our sample period was found to be -0.30%, at the annual rate, with an
autocorrelated-heteroscedastic adjusted t statistic of -17.73.14 The mean of the absolute
value of V was found to be 0.42%, at the annual rate, with an autocorrelated-
heteroscedastic adjusted t statistic of 31.4. Both of these means are far from being zero,
indicating term premium or other risk premia exist, assuming a trivial transaction cost.
Although a completely different approach was used, this result (i.e., on average, the RE
                                                
13 The lag length in augmented Dickey-Fuller or Phillips-Perron nonparametric tests was obtained
according to AIC and SC criteria for a global lag of 20 days.
14  Autocorrelation is due to the overlapping observations. We used, as before, Newey and West’s (1987)
robusterror for 5-order moving average to correct the standard error.
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hypothesis is valid in the United States money market, and risk premia exist) is
consistent, among many others, with the finding of Van Horne (1965), Mankiw and
Miron (1986) and Taylor (1992). 
We will, consequently, modify Equation (10) to 
TBt+1 = FTBt + RPt+1 + Vt+1 = FTBt + Wt+1, (11)
where RP is risk premia and Wt = RPt + Vt. Note that RP includes term, liquidity, interest
exposure and reinvestment risk premia where reinvestment risk premium has a negative
effect on RP. If our index is a satisfactory representative of the monetary policy
transparency in the United States it should have a negative relationship with Wt in
Equation (11), see Thornton (1996), Haldane and Read (2000) and Blinder et al. (2001),
among others, for arguments and econometric tests on the relationship between
transparency and forecast errors of market participants. 
We estimate the following equation:
tW  = ξ0 + ξ1LTt-1 + DUMt-1’ ς + Єt, (12)
where tW  is the absolute value of the forecast error from Equation (11), LTt is
the logarithm of tTˆ , ξ’s are constant parameters, ς is a vector of constant parameters and
Єt is the white noise disturbance term. Vector DUM (defined earlier) included in the
equation in order to capture the impact of monetary policy regime changes as well as
other shocks on the risk premia.
Note that variables LT and DUM enter in Equation (12) with one lag length (three
months ago) since the implied forward rate was used three months before (at the time of
forecast) the actual rate was realized. Our index, if it is a real proxy for monetary
transparency in the United States, should have a negative relationship with the risk
premia if the estimated ξ1 is negative and statistically significant. Since our sample is
daily observations, LT is our extended index and the lag length is 90 days. Note that the
index and the calculated forward rate [an element of tW (= TBt - FTBt-1)] have the same
lag length in Equation (12). However, there is no theoretical reason to believe that the
index can be influenced by the calculated forward rate. Furthermore, we can investigate
the causality between these two stationary variables by estimating each variable by its 20
lagged values as well as the lagged values of the other variable.
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By doing so, we found the Wald test on the coefficients of twenty lagged values
of LTt in a regression of LTt on its twenty lagged values as well as twenty lagged values
of tW  is 113.93 (p-value=0.00), while the Wald test on twenty lagged values of tW  is
14.09 (p-value=0.70). At the same time, the Wald test on the coefficients of twenty
lagged values of tW  in a regression of tW  on its twenty lagged values as well as
twenty lagged values of LTt is 4841.96 (p-value=0.00), while the Wald test on twenty
lagged values of LTt is 48.54 (p-value=0.00). This result implies that LTt Granger causes
tW  while tW  does not Grange cause LTt. Specifically, we conclude LTt is strongly
exogenous in Equation (12).15 
Equation (13) is the parsimonious estimated result of Equation (12), where the
figures in brackets are standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
tW  = 1.03 (0.21) - 0.12 (0.04) LTt-1 - 0.13 (0.02) TAt-1 + 0.15 (0.07) REMAt-1
-0.19 (0.05) GREENt-1+ 0.51 (0.03) D010917t-1 + 0.39 (0.01) D010103t-1 
+ 0.15 (0.01) D940418t-1+ 0.57 (0.15) OCT87t-1 -0.52(0.25) D851231t-1, 
-1.56 (0.38) D861231t-1. (13)
R 2=0.09, σ=0.39, RESET=0.20 (significance level=0.90)
The estimated coefficient of LT is negative and statistically significant implying
that as the monetary policy is more transparent the forecast errors and risk premia will
fall. This result confirms Thornton (1996), Haldane and Read (2000) and Blinder et al.
(2001). According to the estimated coefficient of dummy variable TA, the Fed policy of
changing FF rate at regular FOMC meetings resulted in a lower risk and forecast error in
the money market in the United States. 
The positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient of REMA implies
that modifying the reserve maintenance period from one week (for most large
institutions) to two weeks (for all institutions) in February 1984 resulted in a higher
forecast error, while the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the dummy
variable GREEN means the forecast error in the money market fell during the tenure of
Chairman Greenspan. The estimated coefficient of D010917, as one would expect, is
                                                
15 All Wald test results are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
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positive and statistically significant, which reflects a higher risk environment associated
with September 2001.
Furthermore, as the positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient of
D010103 and OCT87 indicates, the unexpected change in the target rate on
January 3, 2001 and during the October 87 stock crisis resulted in a higher forecast error.
However, according to the estimated coefficient of dummy variable D940418, which is
negative, the forecast error (and/or risk premia) fell on April 18, 1994 when the Fed
changed the FF target outside its regular meetings. The surprising result is the estimated
coefficients of dummy variables D851231 and D861231. Both are negative and
statistically significant implying a high volatility of FF on December 31, 1985 and
December 30 and 31, 1986 resulted in a lower forecast error on those days.
We also used quarterly averages of the daily observations to create a quarterly
sample to test the power of our basic index T. For quarterly observations of T, we also
took the average of our index in each quarter. We adjusted Equation (12) for relevant
quarterly dummy variables and used the Least Squared estimation technique to estimate
the equation with our quarterly data.16 In the first round of regression, among dummy
variables, only REMA was statistically significant. After dropping dummy variables with
statistically insignificant coefficients, we found the coefficient of dummy variable REMA
to be statistically insignificant. We, consequently, dropped this dummy variable from the
regression. The parsimonious estimated Equation (12) with LT being the logarithm of our
quarterly index is as follows: 
tW  = 7.87 (2.41) -1.68 (0.54) LTt-1. (14)
R 2=0.09, σ=0.33, DW=1.69, Godfrey(5)=0.85 (significance level=0.53),
White=2.78 (significance level=0.73), ARCH(5)=3.10 (significance level=0.68),
RESET=0.10 (significance level=0.95)
                                                
16 Again we found LT to be strongly exogenous in Equation (12) as the Wald test on the coefficients of four
lagged (incorporating a year) values of tW  in a regression of tW  on its four lagged values as well as
four lagged values of LTt is 44.98 (p-value=0.00), while the Wald test on twenty lagged values of LTt is
3.96 (p-value=0.41). This result implies that tW  does not Grange cause LTt, indicating that LTt is
strongly exogenous in Equation (12).
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According to the Godfrey test result, the error term is not autocorrelated and as
White and ARCH test results indicate it is also homoscedastic. According to the RESET
test result, there is no misspecification. The negative and statistically significant
coefficient of LT clearly confirms the earlier finding in this paper that a higher monetary
policy transparency leads to a lower forecast error (a higher efficiency in the money
market). 
B. Volatility in the Money Market and the Index
To further investigate the strength of our transparency index we will examine the
relationship between our index and risk, measured by the volatility, in the money market.
It is important to note that theoretically the impact of transparency on volatility is
arguable. For example, in a 1976 Freedom of Information Act filing, the Fed argued in
favor of secrecy motivated by its desire to reduce interest rate variability [see Goodfriend
(1986)]. This view is consistent with the literature [see, e.g., Dotsey (1987)] that argues
that the cleaner and more frequent the “signal” (or the more transparent monetary policy
is) the larger the responsiveness of interest rates to news, and thus the greater their
volatility.
Another strand of the literature, however, argues that more transparency tends to
reduce market volatility. Tabellini (1987), for example, shows that when market
participants face parameter uncertainty (or multiplicative uncertainty) and learn over
time, using Bayes’ rule, the learning process is the source of additional volatility in asset
prices. In this case, more transparency tends to reduce market volatility. Since recent
empirical evidence suggests that the 1994 transparency move by the Fed is not associated
with higher market volatility [e.g., Thornton (1996)], we will follow Tabellini (1987) and
assume a more transparent monetary policy tends to lower volatility.
Earlier in the paper we found that FF and TB are cointegrated and FF Granger
causes TB. Hence, we would expect the volatility of the daily movements in FF, say
VFF, to affect the volatility of the daily movements in TB, say VTB, (i.e., the risk in the
money market). We, therefore, investigate the usefulness of our index in capturing the
impact of monetary policy transparency on the volatility of the money market. We
assume the volatility of TB is a function of the volatility of FF and policy regime changes
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as well as other shocks specified in EDUM defined below. We assume such a
relationship has a linear approximation as specified by Equation (15):
VTBt = Γ0 + γ LTt + ∑Γk
1=i
i-ti VFF + ∑Φk
1=i
i-ti VTB + EDUM t’Γ + εt, (15)
where Γ0,...,Γk , Φ0,..., Φk , γ and Γ are constant parameters. Dummy vector EDUM =
(DUMt, STUt, TUE1t, HBt, HA1t, HB3t, HA3t, LDYt, LQBAt, LQt). Dummy variables
included in DUM were defined earlier. To capture the possible volatility in the money
market created by other factors, like window dressing, holidays and other seasonality,
following Hamilton (1996), we included dummy variables STUt, TUE1t, HB1t, HA1t,
HB3t, HA3t, LDYt, LDBYAt, LQBAt and LQt.
These dummy variables are defined as: STU = 1 on Tuesdays before settlement
Wednesdays and zero, otherwise. TUE1 = 1 on Tuesdays before settlement Wednesdays
if Wednesday was a holiday, and zero, otherwise. HB1 = 1 for the day before a one-day
holiday, and zero, otherwise. HA1 = 1 for the day after a one-day holiday, and zero,
otherwise. HB3 = 1 for the day before a three-day holiday, and zero, otherwise. HA3 = 1
for the day after a three-day holiday, and zero, otherwise. LDY =1 for the last day of the
year, and zero, otherwise. LDBYA = 1 for 2 days before, 1 day before, on, 1 day after, or
2 days after the end of the year, and zero, otherwise. LQBA = 1 for the day before, on, or
after the last day of the first, second and third quarters, and zero, otherwise. And finally,
LQ = 1 for the last day of the first, second, third and fourth quarters, and zero, otherwise. 
Note that in Equation (15) VFF is predetermined and if γ is negative then the higher
the monetary policy transparency (LT) is, the lower the volatility of the three-month
Treasury bill rate will be. Following, among many, Schwert (1989), Kearney (2000) as
well as Kia (2003b), the methodology developed by Davidian and Carroll (1978) was
used. Let x be any variable in column vector xt = (∆TBt, ∆FFt,)’ and estimate
Equation (16) for ∆TBt and ∆FFt. 
xt = ∑α20
1=i
i-t
x
i x  + EDUMt’µx + uxt,  uxt ~niid(0, Σ). (16)
The parameters αx’s and vector µx are assumed to be constant. We assume a lag length of
20 days (reflecting a month) is sufficient for the market participants to learn from the past
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movements in the TB rate. The dummy variables included in vector EDUM capture the
shocks on the rate during our sample period. Furthermore, a 20th-order autoregression for
the absolute values of errors from Equation (16), including dummy variables in vector
EDUM that allow for different daily standard deviations, should be estimated:
|ûxt | = xtσ  = ∑ σδ20
1=i
x
i-t
x
i + EDUMt’η
x + vt, (17)
where xiδ , for i = 1 to 20 and the column vector ηx are constant parameters. The absolute
value of the fitted value of uxt (i.e., |ûxt |) is the standard deviation (adjusted
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) of xt, for xt  = ∆TBt and ∆FFt. However, since the
expected error is lower than the standard deviation from a normal distribution, following
Schwert (1989), all absolute errors are multiplied by the constant 1.2533. 
As it was also mentioned by Kia (2003b), the conditional volatility in Equation (17)
represents a generalization of the 20-day rolling standard estimator used by
Officer (1973), Fama (1976) and Merton (1980). This is due to the fact that the
conditional volatility estimated by Equation (15) allows the conditional mean to vary
over time in Equation (16), while it also allows different weights to be applied to the
lagged absolute unpredicted changes in Treasury bills and Fed funds rates. 
Note that here the conditional mean of these rates was also allowed to vary with the
shocks represented by dummy variables included in vector EDUM. Furthermore,
Engle (1993) reviews the merit of this measure of volatility, among others. This measure
of volatility is similar to the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model
of Engle (1982), which, in its various forms, has been widely used in the finance
literature. Davidian and Carroll (1978) argue that the specification in Equation (17) based
on the absolute value of the prediction errors is more robust than those based on the
squared residuals in Equation (16). 
However, it should be noted that the variables in equations (15) and (17), excluding
dummy variables, are generated regressors. Consequently, when these equations are
estimated, their t statistic should be interpreted with caution. To cope with this problem,
following, among many, Kearney (2000) and Kia (2003b), the equation for the
conditional volatility [i.e., Equation (15)] is estimated jointly with the equations
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determining the conditional volatilities of ∆TB and ∆FF using the generalized Least
Squares (GLS) estimation procedure (SUR).17
In the GLS system, two equations are generated by Equation (16), two equations are
generated by Equation (17) and including Equation (15) a system of five equations with
5,308 observations (with a final sum of 5,034 usable observations) is estimated. In the
GLS estimation, for each equation and the system of equations, we used Newey and
West’s (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average to correct for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation. The GLS estimator incorporates the possibility of cross-equation
correlation among the error terms. The final parsimonious GLS estimation result of
Equation (15) is given by Equation (18), where standard errors appear in brackets.18
VTBt = 0.02 (0.0023) - 0.002 (0.001) LTt - 0.002 (0.0009) VFFt-5 
- 0.002 (0.0003) VFFt-15 + 0.58 (0.03) VTBt-1 + 0.38 (0.03) VTBt-2 
+ 0.09 (0.03) VTBt-3  - 0.13 (0.02) VTBt-4 - 0.32 (0.03) VTBt-5 
+ 0.09 (0.02) VTBt-6 + 0.18 (0.02) VTBt-7 - 0.002 (0.0004) GREENt 
- 0.002 (0.0005) TAFt - 0.006 (0.001) ASIAt - 0.05 (0.0007) D851231t 
- 0.03 (0.003) D861231t - 0.01 (0.0004) D940418t - 0.02 (0.0003) D000202t 
- 0.02 (0.0002) D010103t - 0.02 (0.0003) D010418t
- 0.03 (0.0004) D010917t. (18)
R 2 = 0.88 and σ = the standard error of the regression = 0.0007
The estimated coefficient of our monetary policy index (LT) is negative,
indicating that a more transparent monetary policy leads to a lower volatile money
market. This result confirms the finding of Tabellini (1987), among many, that a higher
degree of transparency tends to lower market volatility. Among all dummy variables
included in EDUM, the coefficients of dummy variables GREEN, TAF, ASIA, D851231,
D861231, D940418, D000202, D010103, D010418 and D010917 were found to be
                                                
17  See Kia (2003b), Footnote 4, for a full explanation on why in our case the GLS estimation technique
should be used.
18 The stationarity test results for VTB are as follows: The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller t,
for a lag length of 8 = 11.07 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric t test for the lag
length of 3 = 52.04, both t statistics are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value) indicating the conditional
volatility VTB is stationary. The stationarity test results for VFF are as follows: The absolute value of the
augmented Dickey Fuller t, for a lag length of 9 = 15.42 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron
non-parametric t-test for the lag length of 10 = 49.49, both t statistics are higher than 2.86 (5% critical
value) indicating the conditional volatility VFF is stationary. 
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statistically significant. As the negative coefficient of dummy variable GREEN indicates,
the volatility and risk in the money market fell during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan.
As it would be expected, the estimated coefficient of TAF is negative, implying that the
Fed’s change of policy regime in October 1989 led to a lower volatility in the money
market in the United States.
As it would be expected, the estimated sign of dummy variable ASIA was
negative, reflecting the massive intervention of all industrial countries’ central banks in
their money markets. The estimated coefficient of dummy variables D851231 and
D861231 is negative implying that the outliers in the Fed funds rate in the last days of
1985 and 1986 resulted in a lower volatility in the Treasury bill rate. The estimated
coefficient of D940418 is negative implying that on April 18, 1994, when the Fed
changed the FF target outside its regular meetings, it helped to lower volatility in the
money market.
According to the estimated negative coefficients of dummy variables D000202
when the FOMC started to include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements replacing
the previous bias statement, it led to a reduction in the volatility in the money market.
Finally, according to the estimated negative coefficients of dummy variables D010103,
D010418 and D010917, a 50-basis point reduction in the target rate on January 3,
April 18 and September 17, 2001 reduced the volatility in the money market. We also
repeated the above exercise with our quarterly data explained above and our basic index.
We found our basic index has a negative effect on volatility, but the estimated coefficient
was not statistically significant. The statistically insignificant coefficient could be due to
a lack of observations on the index in each quarter. In sum, we showed in this section the
monetary policy transparency indexes developed in this paper can be used successfully to
detect the impact of monetary policy transparency on risk and volatility. 
V. Summary and Conclusions
The existing measures of monetary policy transparency include indicators based
on descriptive accounts, surveys, official documents and information as well as market
interest rates. However, these measures have some limitations, such as a lack of an
objectively designed index or indexes without time-series properties. In this paper, we
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developed an objective market-based index, which is dynamic and continuous and can be
used to measure monetary policy transparency for a country or, simultaneously, a series
of countries, using time-series as well as cross-sectional data.
Assuming that participants in the money market are forward looking, we
developed our index for the United States monetary policy for the period October 1982-
December 2003. We also investigated the validity of our assumption and found, in fact,
money market participants are forward looking and, therefore, their behavior can change
with any policy regime or other exogenous shocks in the sense of Lucas (1976).
Furthermore, we found, using our index, that the more transparent the monetary policy in
the United States is, the less risky and volatile the money market will be. Moreover, the
rational expectations model of the term structure is valid in the United States money
market, but risk premia in this market exist.
Using our constructed index, we found a negative relationship between monetary
policy transparency and risk and volatility in the economy. Furthermore, risk and
uncertainty in the money market fell in the United States during the tenure of Chairman
Greenspan. Moreover, the Fed policy of changing Fed funds target rate at regular FOMC
meetings resulted in a lower risk and forecast error in the money market. We also found
that the Fed’s change of policy regime in October 1989, when the Fed started the practice
of changing the Fed funds target rates by 25 or 50 basis points, led to a lower volatility in
the money market. Finally, we conclude that the practice of a more transparent monetary
policy leads to more stability and lower risk in the financial markets.
One possible extension of this study is to modify the index for markets where
market participants are not forward looking. Moreover, future studies should use the
index developed in this paper to investigate if a more transparent monetary policy leads
to higher economic growth. Even though the Federal Reserve became officially
transparent only recently, it would also be interesting to do the same exercise for the
period starting when the Federal Reserve was first established. Finally, one could also
extend this line of research by comparing the power of different time-series market-based
measures of monetary policy transparency, including our index and the popular policy
surprise measures based on Federal funds futures data.
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Figure 1: Long-Run Stability Test
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Figure 2: Monetary Policy Transparency
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 Figure 3: Transparency Index
Figure 4: Extended Transparency Index
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Table 1*: Tests of the Cointegration Rank
H0=r λmax(1) λmax 95(2) Trace(3) Trace 95(2)
0 93.57 18.96 96.95 25.32
1 3.37 12.25 3.37 12.25
Diagnostic tests**:
 LM(1)            p-value = 0.47
 LM(4)            p-value = 0.92
 Normality       p-value = 0.00
(1)  λmax has been adjusted to correct a possible small sample bias error. Namely,  λmax has been multiplied
by the small sample correction factor (N – kp)/N, where N is the number of observations, k is the number
of lags and p is the number of endogenous variables, see Cheung and Lai (1993). Consequently, λmax=(N-
kp) ln(1- Dr).
(2) The source is Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1, p. 469.
(3) Trace has been multiplied by the small sample correction factor (N – kp)/N, see Cheung and Lai (1993).
Consequently, Trace test = - (N-kp) ∑
+=
 
P
1ri
.)i -ln(1 D Both Trace and λmax tests were developed in Johansen
and Juselius (1991). 
* The model includes constant, policy and day-of-the-week dummies. Lag length is 20. 
** LM(1) and LM(4) are one and four-order Lagrangian Multiplier test for autocorrelation, respectively
[Godfrey (1978)].
Table 2: Causality Tests*
Dependent Variable ∆TB ∆TB ∆FF ∆FF
Null H1 H2 H3 H4
k = 1 The optimum
lag length
χ2(3) = 11.12
p = 0.00
χ2(1) = 8.81
 p = 0.00
χ2(1) = 3.81
p = 0.05
χ2(1) = 0.49
p = 0.48
k = 5 χ2(5) = 25.06
p = 0.00
χ2(5) = 17.48
p = 0.00
χ2(5) = 113.11
p = 0.00
χ2(5) = 19.70
p = 0.00
k = 10 χ2(10) = 41.22
p = 0.00
χ2(10) = 19.94
p = 0.03
χ2(10) = 153.52
p = 0.00
χ2(10) = 21.11
p = 0.02
k = 15 χ2(15) = 49.01
p = 0.00
χ2(15) = 29.96
p = 0.01
χ2(15) = 239.22
p = 0.00
χ2(15) = 25.10
p = 0.05
k = 20 χ2(20) = 69.80
p = 0.00
χ2(20) = 42.06
 p = 0.00
χ2(20) = 222.01
p = 0.00
χ2(20 )= 31.67
p = 0.05
* ∆TBt is the first difference of three-month Treasury bill rate and ∆FFt is the first difference of Fed funds
rate. All Wald tests were corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
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Table 3: Conditional and Marginal Models: Treasury Bill and Federal Funds Rates
Explanatory
Variables*
Dependent
Variable=∆TB
Coeff. (Std.Error**)
Hansen’s Stability
Li Test 
(p-value)
Dependent
Variable=∆FF
Coeff.(Std.Error**)
Hansen’s
Stability Li Test
(p-value)
Constant -0.003 (0.001) 1.00 - -
∆TBt-1 0.10 (0.03) 1.00 - -
∆TBt-6 -0.05 (0.02) 1.00 - -
∆TBt-19 0.07 (0.02) 1.00 - -
∆FFt 0.02 (0.01) 0.16 - -
∆FFt-1 0.01 (0.004) 1.00 - -
∆FFt-3 0.01 (0.002) 1.00 - -
ECTBt-1 - 0.01 (0.003) 1.00 - -
ECTB2t-15 0.001 (0.0002) 1.00 - -
(ECTB2)(ECTB3)t-12 0.0000004 (0.0000001) 1.00 - -
∆FFt-2 - - -0.30 (0.06) 1.00
∆FFt-3 - - -0.15 (0.02) 1.00
∆FFt-5 - - -0.10 (0.02) 1.00
∆FFt-6 - - -0.10 (0.02) 1.00
∆FFt-7 - - -0.09 (0.02) 1.00
∆FFEDAYt-1 - - -0.68 (0.17) 1.00
∆FFEDAYt-4 - - -0.14 (0.05) 1.00
∆FFTAFt-1 - - -0.43 (0.04) 1.00
∆FFREMAt-19 - - 0.07 (0.03) 1.00
∆FFD020319t-10 - - 0.28 (0.06) 1.00
∆FFD010418t-18 - - -1.06 (0.12) 1.00
∆FFOCT87t-9 - - -0.74 (0.16) 1.00
Variance - 0.00 - 0.00
 
R 2=0.04, σ=0.06
DW=1.99, Godfrey (5) =2.17
(p-value=0.04), White=428
(p-value=0.00), ARCH
(5)=443 (p-value=0.00) 
Joint (coeffs + var.)
=12.11 
(p-value=0.00)
R 2=0.18, σ=0.30
DW=2.23, Godfrey (5)
=29.35 (p-value=0.00),
White=8.29 (p-
value=1.00), ARCH
(5)=206 (p-value=0.00)  
Joint (coeffs +
var.)=10.97 (p-
value=0.00)
* ∆TBt is the first difference of three-month Treasury bill rate, ∆FFt is the first difference of Fed funds rate,
ECTB is the error-correction terms when the long-run relationship (1) is normalized on TB. ∆FFEDAY is
the product of ∆FF and EDAY, where EDAY is equal to one for the days (“event”) when the Federal funds
target rate was changed and it is equal to zero, otherwise. ∆FFTAF is the product of ∆FF and dummy
variable TAF, which is equal to 1 since February 4, 1994 and to zero, otherwise. ∆FFREMA is the product
of ∆FF and dummy variable REMA, which is equal to 1 since February 2, 1984 and to zero, otherwise.
∆FFD020319 is the product of ∆FF and dummy variable D020319t which is equal to one since March 19,
2002, when the Fed included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter
members (if any), and zero, otherwise. ∆FFD010418 is the product of ∆FF and dummy variable D010418,
which is equal to one on April 18, 2001 and zero, otherwise. ∆FFOCT87 is the product of ∆FF and dummy
variable OCT87, which is equal to one for October 19 to 30, 1987 and zero, otherwise.
** Newey and West’s (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average was used to correct for
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
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Table 4: Superexogeneity Tests for Variable ∆FFt*
Variables** Chi-Squared (1)
(p-values)
∆FFt - ηFF 0.27
(0.60)
σFF (∆FFt – ηFF) 1.33
(0.25)
(ηFF)2 0.56
(0.45)
(ηFF)3 3.80
(0.05)
σFF ηFF 4.45
(0.03)
σFF (ηFF)2 0.01
(0.91)
(σFF)2 ηFF 0.19
(0.67)
DevFF 7.16
(0.01)
F-Statistics (or Chi-Squared) on null
hypothesis that coefficients of all constructed
variables in this column are jointly zero.
7.29 (or 58.32)
(0.00) or (0.00)
*∆TBt = α0 + ψ0 ∆FFt + (δ0 - ψ0) (∆FFt – ηFFt) + δ1 σtFF (∆FFt – ηFFt) + ψ1 (ηFFt)2 + ψ2 (ηFFt)3 + ψ3 σtFF ηFFt 
   + ψ4 σtFF (ηFFt)2 + ψ5 σtFF (ηFFt)2  + ψ6 DevFFt  + z’tγ + ut.
Newey and West’s (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average was used to correct for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity. R 2=0.04, σ=0.06, DW=1.98, Godfrey (5)=1.26 (significance level=0.27), White=239
(significance level=0.01) and ARCH (5)=285 (significance level=0.00).
** ∆TB is the first difference of three-month Treasury bill rate, ∆FF is the first difference of Fed funds rate,
ηFF is the conditional mean of ∆FF, σFF is the conditional variance of ∆FF, and DevFF is the deviation of
variance of the error term from a five-period ARCH error of ∆FF.
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Table 5: Policy Regime Changes and Monetary Transparency -
Standard Errors Adjusted for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation in Brackets
Period Quarterly Index Daily Index
Oct. 1982-Aug. 1987 77.75 (2.79) 80.84 (1.14)
Change in: 
Aug. 1987-Dec. 2003: Greenspan period* 8.06 (3.07) 6.26 (1.22)
Oct. 1982-Oct. 1989 78.19 (2.20) 81.81 (0.86)
Change in: 
Oct. 1989-Dec. 2003: 25 and 50 bp period** 8.66 (2.52) 5.78 (0.98)
Oct. 1982-Feb. 1994 81.26 (1.73) 83.14 (0.66)
Change in: 
Feb. 1994-Dec. 2003: Announcing Target Change
period***
5.83 (2.29) 5.43 (0.84)
Oct. 1982-Aug. 1997 82.11 (1.48) 83.79 (0.54)
Change in: 
Aug. 1997-Dec. 2003: Target & NY period**** 6.19 (2.33) 6.28 (0.83)
Oct. 1982-May. 1999 82.24 (1.36) 84.10 (0.50)
Change in: 
May 1999-Dec. 2003: Explanation period***** 7.87 (2.44) 7.22 (0.86)
Oct. 1982-Feb. 2000 82.22 (1.29) 84.24 (0.48)
Change in: 
Feb. 2000-Dec. 2003: Balance of Risk
period******
9.45 (2.32) 7.78 (0.89)
Oct. 1982-Mar. 2002 82.81 (1.22) 84.81 (0.46)
Change in: 
Mar. 2002-Dec. 2003: Vote & Names
period*******
12.68 (1.38) 10.22 (0.66)
*Alan Greenspan took office as Chairman of the Fed on August 11, 1987.
** On October 19, 1989, the Fed started the practice of changing the Fed funds target rate in multiples of
25 and 50 basis points.
***Beginning on February 4, 1994, the Fed started announcing policy decisions at the conclusion of the
FOMC meetings. 
****The FOMC started to include a quantitative Fed funds rate in its Directive to the NY Fed Trading
desk.
***** Since May 18, 1999, the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started to
include in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective developments (or the
policy bias). 
****** On January 19, 2000, the FOMC issued a press statement explaining that it would include a
balance-of-risks sentence in its statements, replacing the previous bias statement. The practice was first
implemented the following FOMC meeting, on February 2.
******* Since March 19, 2002, the Fed has included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the
name of dissenter members (if any).
